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Despite its claim that a true description of the universe would require a language of 
paradox and contradiction, mysticism claims of its metaphysical scheme that it is 
Euclidean, that from its first axiom or principle the remainder of the system would 
follow according to a specifiable logic. Its metaphysical scheme must have this 
epistemological property as it describes a universe for which this would be an 
ontological property. Perhaps the most basic metaphysical claim made by the mystics 
over the ages is that the universe is a unity, that all plurality is some kind of dream or 
illusion. There would be no true contradictions, for a true contradiction would be as 
impossible in reality as it is absurd in logic. The universe would be reasonable.       
 
This essay is an attempt to show how this claim that the universe is reasonable might 
be reconciled with the notoriously self-contradictory unreasonableness of the language 
used by the ‘mystics’ to describe it. Their metaphysical doctrine may seem paradoxical, 
and it is usually dismissed from metaphysics for being so, but Lao-tsu tells us that true 












Reason in metaphysics, even if it tries, as it professes, only to gain a priori insight into those 
laws which are confirmed by our most common experience, is constantly being brought to a 
standstill, and we are obliged again and again to retrace our steps, as they do not lead us 
where we want to go. As to unanimity among its participants, there is so little of it in 
metaphysics that it has rather become an arena that would become especially suited for those 
who wish to exercise themselves in mock fights, and where no combatant has as yet 
succeeded in gaining even an inch of ground that he could call his permanent possession.  
 
Immanuel Kant  
Critique of Pure Reason   
 
These words seem as apt and insightful today as ever. The problem infects all 
disciplines that ask metaphysical questions. Scientific consciousness studies would be 
an easy example. Those who argue for mind-only or matter-only theories, or for mind-
matter-only theories,  already know that metaphysics does not support their case any 
better than it does those of their opponents and can only waive their hands at them 
ineffectually. It might be the first rule of metaphysics that it does not produce a 
positive result. However much we twist and turn our arguments trying to make it 
endorse an extreme metaphysical position we cannot find a way to do it. Kant does not 
describe an historical situation, nor is this a record of his own confusion. He describes 
what we all discover when we do metaphysics. We discover that all selective 
conclusions about the world as a whole are logically indefensible, do not survive in the 
dialectic, cannot be true unless the world is paradoxical. Let us pause from hand-
waving, then, and see whether there may be a way forward for metaphysics, a way to 
escape from Kant’s arena. Let us examine the reason why we have to continually 
retrace our steps in metaphysics, why we can never gain an inch of ground.  
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In our loosely ‘western’ tradition of philosophical investigation we have been searching 
for a metaphysical position that would be consistent with our reason and account for 
the facts for more than two millennia and have not found one. Yet if the universe is 
‘reasonable’ or ‘rational’ such that we would judge its explanation reasonable if we 
knew what it was and understood it, as we must assume it is for metaphysics, then 
there must be at least one metaphysical position that would meet this specification, one 
theory or description of the universe that would seem reasonable to us if we stumbled 
across it. So where is this theory? Why is it so difficult to discover?        
 
In the physical sciences we can turn a blind eye to this problem for much of the time 
and say, with some justification, that metaphysics has nothing to do with us. 
Metaphysics is not optional for fundamental theories, however, and if we bury our 
head in the sand in this way we can build only sandcastles. In physics we can have no 
plausible fundamental theory for anything at all until we have solved one or more of 
the mysterious paradoxes and riddles that arise for any investigation of first principles. 
Nor have we found a solution in any popular brand of monotheism. Whitehead 
characterised the Christianity of the West as a religion ‘in search of a metaphysic,’ but 
in truth it seems content to be without one. On this basis many are tempted to dismiss 
the Church’s teachings as false. Unfortunately, or perhaps fortunately, we cannot 
dismiss a religious doctrine on the grounds that it is philosophically flawed unless we 
can show that there is even such a thing as a logically defensible metaphysical position. 
If we cannot do this then we are back in the arena handwaiving.      
               
The difficulty of showing that there is such a position has led many metaphysicians to 
the view that the task is hopeless. They conclude that metaphysics is incapable of 
producing a positive answer for any of its central questions, and that all we learn from 
it is that questions about the nature and properties of the universe as a whole are 
undecidable. All important problems of philosophy are attempts to decide one or other 
of these questions and thus to many people the whole of philosophy looks hopeless. It 
has been proposed by Chalmers1 that we have no other option than to settle for a 
                                                        
1  Chalmers, David. J., The Conscious Mind, (OUP 1996), and ‘Facing up to the problem of consciousness,’ 
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2: 200-219, (1995).    
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nonreductive Mind-Matter theory to account for human consciousness, specifically his 
naturalistic dualism, since the more deeply we explore the question of whether Mind 
or Matter is fundamental the more clear it becomes that neither idea is logically 
defensible, and there seems to him no other idea available. The problem would be 
assumed to be intractable, and a truce would at least be a rest from all the fighting. In 
contemporary physics there is even talk of ex nihilo creation, so impotent can 
rationalism seem in the face of the riddles of existence.   
 
This gloomy view is not forced on us, however, for a different approach is possible. 
We can, if we wish, take this perennial failure of analysis to endorse any extreme 
metaphysical position as an important result of the science of logic. Rather than 
interpreting this ‘failure’ of metaphysics to as we usually would for physics and 
philosophy, as evidence of a barrier to knowledge or the intellectual inadequacy of 
human beings, or perhaps as a justification for ‘mysterianism’, ‘dialethism’ and other 
unscientific theories, we could interpret it as a vital clue for our investigation into the 
origin and nature of the universe, an empirical fact from which it might be possible to 
extrapolate to a fundamental theory. If metaphysics cannot produce a positive result 
then this may be merely the evidence that all positive metaphysical positions are 
wrong, do not describe reality accurately.                
 
This might seem a straightforward approach to doing metaphysics, almost a naïve one, 
and a person new to the topic might wonder why metaphysicians do not usually adopt 
it. The reason would be that it is not as straightforward as it seems. Once we take this 
approach we are forced to adopt a neutral metaphysical position. We will have 
eliminated all others from our investigation for being absurd. We must now adopt the 
only position that would boldly predict the inability of metaphysics to produce a 
positive result. This is not obviously a viable position to take up. It might seem 
paradoxical, absurd, irrational even, not so much a metaphysical position as the 
absence of one. For most people it would represent a paradigm shift. The correct 
answer to the question ‘Is Mind or Matter fundamental?’ would now be ‘no’. To take 
this approach, by which we would simply abandon all philosophical positions known to 
be logically absurd, is to simplify philosophy in certain ways but it would not be to 
make the issues any less sophisticated.  
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It might appear that by taking this approach we would be abandoning metaphysics 
almost before it has begun. Yet a significant minority of widely respected philosophers 
have made arguments for it. Parmenides, Zeno, Heraclitus, Plotinus, Spinoza, Hegel, 
Schopenhauer, Bradley, Jung, Peirce, Erwin Schrödinger and G. S. Brown would be 
some prominent examples, and it seems to me that Kant only narrowly avoids making a 
strong case in the Critique.   
 
 
2. An Argument from Metaphysics 
 
For those who believe that its questions ought to be decidable metaphysics is a 
famously frustrating business. By the same token, it is a source of reassurance for 
those who believe otherwise. Into this latter category would fall the mystics of all ages 
and cultures. It is because they believe otherwise that a formal argument for their view 
can be made from within metaphysics. It is old argument, an extension of one with 
which Buddhist philosophers will be most familiar. It can be arranged into something 
like a syllogism.    
 
a) All positive metaphysical positions are logically indefensible 
b) A neutral metaphysical position is logically defensible 
c) The universe is a unity   
 
As it stands the argument is casual but it is at least metaphysical. Even so, if these 
three propositions are not true, once given their intended interpretation, then the 
doctrine of Mahayana Buddhism is not true. This little argument is therefore of great 
importance in the philosophies of both East and West. If we can refute the first or last 
of these statements then we will have refuted the philosophy of Lao-tsu and the 
Buddha. If we cannot, then we must concede that it is at least logically sound. Because 
these statements make no ‘appeal to mysticism’ this little argument allows us to test 
the plausibility of the metaphysical scheme of the mystics from within metaphysics, as 
just another putative theory. Such an exploration will be the task of this essay. We stay 




Proposition a) All positive metaphysical positions are logically indefensible.  
 
We can know from the failure of metaphysics to endorse a positive position that in 
respect of logic there is nothing to prevent the ideal reasoner from concluding that 
Proposition a) is true. Unless we conjecture that most philosophers are muddled 
thinkers, and all of them muddled in just the same way, then their ubiquitous 
conclusion, or failure to reach a conclusion, is powerful evidence for its truth. If this 
proposition is demonstrably false then the doctrine of Buddhism is demonstrably false, 
so clearly it is not easily falsified. Its truth is already taken for granted in most of 
philosophy.  
 
Oddly, however, and on reflection it really is quite odd, while the logical indefensibility 
of positive metaphysical positions can be established in philosophy and has been many 
times, the idea that such positions are indefensible because they are wrong, because 
they do not correctly describe the universe, is usually considered heretical. It is an 
obvious inference to make, and it might even seem a little perverse not to make it. It 
would be in this sense that when we make it we are adopting a naïve approach to 
metaphysics, for we would simply be going with the flow of our reason. So why do we 
not all make it?       
 
One reason for not immediately conceding that the truth of Proposition a) would imply 
the falsity of positive metaphysical positions is that when we extrapolate from their 
logical absurdity to their falsity in the real world,  as we normally would for an absurd 
theory or idea, our view immediately becomes approximately consistent with that of 
Lao-tsu and the Buddha. Not everyone is tempted to set out on such an adventure. So 
what else can we infer from it? The only alternative is to conclude that according to 
reason the universe does not conform to a logically defensible metaphysical position, 
and thus that philosophy is largely a waste of time. Russell opts for this pessimistic 
view, writing forthrightly in his Problems of Philosophy, ‘Knowledge concerning the 
world as a whole is not to be obtained in metaphysics.’ But Russell’s pessimism was 
largely self-inflicted. A different view of metaphysics is possible, one by which his view 
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would be contingent if not actually temperamental. For many philosophers, among 
them his colleague G. S. Brown, for whose book on mathematics, metaphysics and 
mysticism Russell wrote a glowing endorsement but seems to have awarded only a 
superficial reading, the indefensibility of positive metaphysical positions would be a 
vital piece of knowledge concerning the world as a whole, the most important that 
could be obtained in any strictly scholastic metaphysics, a secure fact from which it 
would be possible to derive an entire cosmological scheme. On this view, the failure of 
metaphysics to endorse an extreme metaphysical view would be a proof of its 
importance and value as a discipline.  
 
Let us pause to clarify some terms and ideas. A ‘metaphysical’ question, once reduced 
to its essentials, will present us with a choice between two positive metaphysical 
positions. ‘Is Mind or Matter fundamental?’ would be typical. Such questions ask us to 
choose between conflicting world-theories, to choose whether the world as a whole is 
this as opposed to that, has this property as opposed to that property. Is Scepticism 
true or false? Is Internalism or Externalism true? Is the universe One or Many? Is 
space-time fundamental? Does freewill exist? Do I exist? Does anything exist?  Built 
into these questions is the questioner’s expectation of an unambiguous answer, an 
expectation that arises from a prior assumption that the universe conforms to a positive 
metaphysical position. Such questions arise ineluctably for the underlying assumption, 
and in every case both of their answers are found to give rise to contradictions. 
Metaphysics will not endorse any of them.     
 
Some questions are metaphysical in character yet do not ask us to adopt a positive 
position. These would include: Why are there laws of nature? Why does anything 
exist? If God is Good why is there suffering?  For the definition of a metaphysical 
question used here these would not be exceptions to the rule but second-order 
questions. They are predicated, respectively, on the assumption that there are laws of 
nature, that anything exists and that suffering is real, and so do not directly address 
first principles. First-order questions would be: Are there laws of nature? Does 
anything exist? Is suffering real? These questions ask us to choose between two 
complementary and contradictory extreme metaphysical positions.    
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In the language of Kant a positive metaphysical position would be a ‘selective 
conclusion about the world as a whole’. Kant rejects all such conclusions as 
undecidable. In making such a selection we are forced to choose between two 
demonstrably absurd positions and our reason prevents us from doing this. If we wish 
to adopt a positive metaphysical position then we must assume that our reason is not 
to be trusted. In the philosophical schemes of Hegel and Bradley, for which the 
‘psychophysical’ universe, the world of mental and corporeal phenomena, would 
reduce to a symmetry beyond the contradictions of selective or partial metaphysical 
views, a positive metaphysical position would be any one for which plurality is more 
than mere appearance. The universe would be a pristine unity, and this would be the 
reason why it is possible to demonstrate that any other view is logically indefensible. 
Perhaps this view might seem to fail for other reasons, but it would be difficult to 
imagine a more simple and elegant explanation for metaphysical dilemmas than that 
they are not built of two truths but of two falsities.   
 
Some examples of positive metaphysical positions would be the common forms of 
materialism, idealism, theism, dualism, monism, nihilism, realism, solipsism, scepticism 
and  epiphenomenalism. All of these ‘isms’ make an explicit or implicit selective claim 
about the universe as a whole. Examples are everywhere. As Russell noted, even 
though we might not notice it a large proportion of our sentences begin, ‘There exists 
x such that …’. We are thus doomed to make a positive metaphysical claim almost as 
soon as we begin to speak. In physics and philosophy any theory for which the 
universe is assigned fundamental selective properties will embody a positive 
metaphysical position and must fail in logic. In consciousness studies all mind-matter 
only theories will be extreme metaphysical positions and fail in metaphysics. A 
religious doctrine will embody a positive metaphysical position if it is not rigorously 
apophatic, for otherwise it will be tricked by language into making selective claims.     
 
To say that a metaphysical position is ‘logically indefensible’ would be to say that it 
gives rise to contradictions, is formally ‘absurd’, can be refuted by the use of 
Aristotle’s three laws of logic and dialectic method. Thus Proposition a) can be read as 
stating that wherever a fundamental theory implies a positive metaphysical position it 
can be refuted in the dialectic. Or, in other words, a consistent theory embodying a 
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positive metaphysical position cannot be completed. We would not need to examine 
the theory closely. The details will make no difference. The theory will rest on the 
assumption that metaphysics can produce a positive result, that not all selective 
conclusions about the world are undecidable, and if we learn anything for certain from 
the study of metaphysics it is that once we rule out a neutral metaphysical position it 
becomes a mock battle, a game of chess with the Devil for which the best result we can 
hope for is a stalemate.   
 
Logic cannot decide what is actually true in reality, but the proposition that all positive 
metaphysical positions are logically indefensible appears to be irrefutable in philosophy. 
At the same time its truth in reality would not be implausible, for this would be by far 
the simplest explanation for why metaphysics cannot produce a positive result. If this 
proposition is true then it would be an error to interpret a metaphysical question as a 
disguised form of the liar paradox or to dismiss it as meaningless, two common but 
difficult to defend strategies for explaining away its undecidability. The issues would 
be simpler than this. Metaphysical questions would be meaningful, and they would be 
undecidable for the same reason as is the question, ‘Would two plus two equal three or 
five?’ Carnap rejects metaphysical statements as meaningless on the grounds that they 
cannot be empirically confirmed or refuted, but his view is conjectural. He dismisses 
the claims of the mystics to empirical knowledge without a thought. Besides, in logic 
the entire problem with statements of the kind he is considering is that we can refute 
them quite easily, and this is not consistent with their meaninglessness.   
 
There are few formal proofs of Proposition a) but two are widely known. Bradley’s 
metaphysical essay Appearance and Reality is one. Bradley systematically refutes all 
positive metaphysical positions to show that the universe must be a unity. His 
argument is a prose version of the proof presented more briefly and rigorously in verse 
form by the second-century Buddhist philosopher-saint Nagarjuna. What the reductio 
arguments of Zeno of Alea do for certain positive metaphysical positions the 
arguments of Bradley and Nagarjuna do for all of them, and by the same method.  In 
his Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, by way a series of terse but exhaustive 
reductio arguments, Nagarjuna demonstrates that all positive metaphysical positions 
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are logically indefensible.2 This demonstration sets the scene for his theory of 
emptiness. This theory, as it is usually denoted, is the philosophical expression of 
Mahayana Buddhism, the famous ‘Middle Way’ doctrine, so named partly because it 
does not embody a positive metaphysical position. For Nagarjuna’s theory we would 
have to approach metaphysical dilemmas as would the professors of the Colleges of 
Unreason encountered by the hero of Samuel Butler’s Erewhon, who take the view, 
‘Extremes are alone logical, but they are always absurd; the mean is illogical, but an 
illogical mean is better than the sheer absurdity of an extreme.’  
 
The proofs of Bradley and Nagarjuna are made by abduction, the method 
recommended by Sherlock Holmes for solving cases involving multiple suspects and 
only circumstantial evidence.  One by one the suspects are eliminated from the enquiry, 
and if we find that there is only one left, as in the end there is for Bradley and 
Nagarjuna’s investigation, then the case is as good as closed. If all positive 
metaphysical positions can be ruled out as logically absurd then the only metaphysical 
position it would be rational to take up is a neutral one. Or, at least, this would be the 
only rational position to take up just so long as it is not also logically absurd, and this 
is why the second proposition of our argument is required. For Bradley and Nagarjuna 
the  first and last propositions are enough.           
        
We can concede here that if a metaphysical position is logically indefensible then it 
need not follow that it is false. We usually take it for granted that a false proposition 
will be logically indefensible and that a logically indefensible proposition will be false. 
This is because we usually assume that the universe is reasonable. We cannot take this 
for granted in metaphysics, however, where everything depends on it. As we have 
seen, many metaphysicians come to believe that the universe is not reasonable. For a 
rigorous argument we would have to close this loophole or add a proviso. Aristotle 
spots this problem and in De Interpretatione tells us that whether we can legitimately 
apply his three principles for dialectic logic to the world is not something that can be 
known a priori but is an empirical matter. Nagarjuna does not attempt to show that his 
metaphysical view is ‘true’, only that all of the alternatives are unreasonable. Bradley 
                                                        
2 This discussion is heavily reliant on Garfield, Jay. The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nagarjuna’s 
Mulamadhyamakakarika, (OUP, 1995).  
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addresses the issue directly by noting that we are forced to concede that the universe 
might be reasonable since any attempt to prove otherwise would be self-defeating. This 
is less than a proof of its reasonableness, however, and Aristotle must be right to say 
that whether the universe obeys some set of logical principles is an empirical matter. It 
may be possible to logically prove that the best explanation of the universe would be 
that it is reasonable, but a sceptic could still argue that what appears to be the best 
explanation may not be the correct one, and who is to say what ‘best’ means? Perhaps 
in philosophy the most we can hope for is a proof that it would be perverse to believe 
the universe is unreasonable, and in philosophy, apart from a small number of 
proponents of Dialethism and Mysterianism, we may all believe this already.  Let us 
suppose that Proposition a) is true and move on.    
 
 
Proposition b) A neutral metaphysical position is logically defensible   
 
For a neutral metaphysical position we must abandon all positive positions.3 There is, 
therefore, only one such position, for if we deviate even a fraction from neutrality we 
abandon it. Metaphysical neutralism may be briefly and precisely defined in this 
negative manner, it being quite easy to say what it is not. It is a lot more difficult to say 
what it is, notoriously so, but we need not attempt this quite yet. All that matters 
initially here for the sake of the case being assembled is that once the truth of the first 
proposition is conceded there are powerful reasons for investigating Proposition b). If 
we can show that Proposition b) is false, as we usually assume it is for our traditional 
metaphysics, then while metaphysics may continue to be a useful ‘antidote to dogmatic 
superstition,’ as Bradley characterises it, as a path to positive knowledge it would be a 
dead end. The universe would be incomprehensible in any rational philosophy since all 
metaphysical positions would be demonstrably absurd. By contrast, if we can show 
that this second proposition is true then metaphysics would be a very direct path to 
knowledge, even if only of the relative kind. It would be a way of working out that the 
metaphysical scheme proposed by the Buddha and Lao-tsu is the only one that is 
                                                        
3 In case there should be any confusion, the neutral position for which a case is being made here is not the Mind-
Matter neutralism rejected by Peirce as dualism, for which Mind and Matter would be irreducible. Peirce calls 
this ‘metaphysical neutralism,’ a rare use of this phrase. Like Chalmers’ ‘naturalistic dualism’ this is explicitly 
nonreductive and not a fundamental theory.    
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logically defensible. Hence Proposition b) claims a great deal and represents a 
significant challenge. It is rarely taken up, but we must take it up once we have 
extrapolated from the absurdity of positive metaphysical positions to their falsity. If we 
believe that the universe is reasonable then a neutral position is now all that remains 
open to us and there is little we can do but try to defend our new position. This will be 
our situation regardless of the ramifications of this position for God, consciousness, 
space-time, ethics and so forth.  
 
Before examining the truth of Proposition b) further let us explore some surrounding 




PART II   
 
 
Reality is one. It must be single, because plurality, taken as real, contradicts itself. Plurality 
implies relations, and, through its relations, it unwillingly asserts always a superior unity. To 
suppose the universe plural is therefore to contradict oneself and, after all, to suppose that it is 
one. Add one world to another, and forthwith both worlds have become relative, each the 
finite appearance of a higher and single Reality. And plurality as appearances …must fall 
within, must belong to, must qualify the unity.  
 We have an idea of this unity which, to some extent, is positive. It is true that how in 
detail the plurality comes together we do not know. And it is true again that unity, in its more 
proper sense, is known only as contra-distinguished from plurality. Unity therefore, as an 
aspect over against and defined by another aspect, is itself but appearance. And in this sense 
the Real, it is clear, cannot be properly called one. It is possible, however, to use unity with a 
different meaning. 
 
Francis H. Bradley   
Appearance and Reality  
 
 
We have said that our three propositions represent an argument for mysticism. This 
was on the basis, first, that if Proposition b) were removed what would remain is the 
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argument presented by the Nagarjuna in his Fundamental Wisdom,4 and, second, that 
metaphysical neutrality is a feature of the doctrine of all the world’s principal wisdom 
traditions. We need not define this tradition closely for the moment. It may appear as 
the ‘Middle Way’, advaita or ‘nondual’ doctrine; the doctrine of ‘dependent 
origination’; ‘emptiness’, ‘unity’ or ‘unicity’ or ‘the Mean’. Also as the ‘perennial 
philosophy’ or the ‘primordial cosmology’. For his list of seventeen kinds of theories 
of consciousness Broad calls it ‘pure neutralism.’ In metaphysics it may be called 
‘absolute idealism’ or ‘neutral monism’, but these are ambiguous phrases. Both may be 
interpreted as implying a positive claim about the universe and they will not be used 
here. The phrase ‘metaphysical neutralism’ is inelegant and unevocative, but is it at 
least unambiguously the absence of any such claim and a trustworthy mnemonic.   
 
The proposition that the doctrine of mysticism is metaphysically neutral raises complex 
issues. If it can be justified, however, then the difficult relationship between 
metaphysics and mysticism can be considerably simplified. Even if the only thing we 
know about a cosmological theory is that it is metaphysically neutral we can deduce 
how, in principle, it would solve all metaphysical dilemmas and account for their 
undecidability. It would be no great feat of deduction or learning. The answer would 
be the same in each case, the rejection of all extreme views in favour of a global 
compatibilism. Thus without any need to study the literature, let alone take up the 
practice, we would be able to identify mysticism’s solution for any particular 
metaphysical problem and predict what will be said about it in the teachings of the 
various traditions. This is useful, since testing these predictions against the literature is 
a very direct way to verify that the phrase ‘the doctrine of mysticism’ can be justified. 
Our traditional metaphysics would be the study of extreme views, while mysticism 
would be their rejection for an ‘illogical mean’ or, rather, what we hope to show is not 
an illogical mean. This leaves us just one metaphysical theory to study.     
 
It might seem implausible that all metaphysical problems could have the same solution 
but it might also be what makes mysticism’s solution so plausible, that it would act as a 
universal solvent. If it is the correct solution then its universality would be in accord 
                                                        
4 Mulamadhyamakakarika.  Lit. ‘Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way.’ 
 14
with the conclusion of Heidegger and others that all metaphysical problems are 
essentially the same problem, or arise from the same problem. It is not likely that we 
will ever prove otherwise and it is not usually considered a controversial idea. Such 
questions are in a sense holographic. If so, then they should have a common solution. 
By assuming the holographic nature of these questions we do not make life any easier 
for ourselves, for now the solution for one metaphysical problem must be the solution 
for all of them, and if it is not the solution for all of them then it cannot be the solution 
for any one of them. This would be a tough specification for a solution to meet. Yet a 
neutral metaphysical position meets it exactly. Heidegger seems to have known this, 
for after reading a book by Zen scholar D. T. Suzuki he is reported as saying, ‘If I 
understand correctly, this is what I have been trying to say in all my writings.’5  Thus 
not only would the relationship between metaphysics and mysticism be simplified by 
noting that the latter is a neutral metaphysical position, but also metaphysics itself may 
also be considerably simplified.  
 
The idea of a neutral metaphysical position would also be useful well beyond 
metaphysics. If the doctrine of mysticism is metaphysically neutral then this is all we 
would need to know about it in order to derive many of its most profound predictions 
for fundamental physics, consciousness studies, psychology and elsewhere. Because of 
this the stakes are high here. The proposal that mysticism is a neutral metaphysical 
position and logically defensible as such puts at risk not just the idea that the doctrine 
of mysticism is unreasonable, but also the idea that it makes no testable predictions for 
the natural sciences.             
    
It might easily be doubted that for all its many and varied appearances there is just one 
doctrine of mysticism and that it is metaphysically neutral. A justification would 
require an extensive literature review. By indicating how this claim might be justified, 
however, the idea of a neutral metaphysical position can be brought to life a little and 
the claims made by propositions b) and c) partially clarified. Nagarjuna provides us 
with a place to start with his theory of emptiness and concomitant doctrine of ‘two 
truths’ or ‘two worlds’.         
                                                        
5 In Kapleau, Philip, The Three Pillars of Zen, Anchor Books, 2000 
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For many people Nagarjuna would be the most significant figure in Buddhism after 
Shakyamuni Buddha. He is the founder of the Madhyamika or ‘Middle Path’ schools 
of Mahayana Buddhism and the most widely studied of all Buddhist philosophers. The 
Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way is his largest and best known text. Here he 
systematically refutes the idea that psychophysical phenomena have an inherent or 
independent existence, that there is an ‘essence’ to which their attributes adhere. Such 
phenomena would have to be conceived as something like Shannon’s ‘information’,  
aggregates of ‘differences that make a difference,’ and not as substantial subjects and 
objects. Mental and corporeal phenomena would exist in a sense, this is evident, but 
they would have no existence ‘from their own side,’ and for an ultimate analysis would 
not ‘really’ exist. He shows that the adoption of any other view will lead directly to an 
absurd metaphysical position.  
 
We need not worry here about the details of Nagarjuna’s argument, nor even about 
whether it succeeds. We need note only two things. First, that for Nagarjuna’s view we 
must abandon all positive metaphysical positions; second, that a defining feature of a 
neutral metaphysical position is the illusory nature of psychophysical phenomena. From 
the first we can infer that Buddhism’s Middle Way doctrine would not conflict with the 
results of philosophy or the natural sciences,  which are known to be consistent with 
the falsity of all positive metaphysical positions, and from the second we can confirm 
that his doctrine is not idiosyncratic in mysticism. All traditions proclaim the 
epiphenomenal or illusive nature of the psychophysical universe, and a fundamental 
theory for which psychophysical phenomena are some kind of illusion must be 
metaphysically neutral, since if it were not then these phenomena would 
unambiguously exist or not-exist.         
 
We are not immediately concerned here with how reasonable Nagarjuna’s theory 
would be in a technical sense, but we can note in passing that his proof of Proposition 
a) is entirely dependent on the reasonableness of the universe. It might even be read as 
a proof that the universe is reasonable. If the universe were unreasonable then a true 
explanation of it would contradict our reason, and in this case positive metaphysical 
theories would be logically defensible after all. Were Nagarjuna defending an 
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unreasonable universe his argument would never get off the ground. His argument 
must fail unless we assume that where a proposition or theory is wrong it will be 
logically indefensible, and that where it is logically indefensible it will be wrong. By 
extension his argument states that a logically defensible and (in this sense) reasonable 
explanation of the universe would not embody a positive metaphysical position.      
   
Nagarjuna’s proof is the philosophical underpinning for his ‘theory of emptiness’ and 
doctrine of ‘two truths’ or ‘worlds’. This states that there is typically a fundamental 
disparity between the way we perceive the world and the way it actually is. There 
would be two worlds, or aspects of the world, the conventional and the ultimate, and 
because we would, as it were, have a foot in each camp, there would be these two 
distinct standpoints from which we can perceive and make statements about the world 
as a whole. When we are speaking of them these two worlds, or aspects of the world, 
would stand in a relationship of contradictory complementary, such that a statement 
true for one would be false for the other. Psychophysical phenomena would exist in 
one world but not in the other, for example, and so would not ‘really’ exist, or would 
both ‘exist and not-exist,’ while an unambiguous statement to the effect that these 
phenomena do or do not exist would be neither true nor false but unrigorous, 
inadequate, not exactly right and logically indefensible. For Nagarjuna’s doctrine we 
would require a logic and language of two truths, where each truth on its own would 
only take into account half of what it is ought to take into account, and within which a 
statement of the whole truth would seem self-contradictory. With its characteristic 
brevity and rigour the Tao Teh Ching puts this as, ‘True words seem paradoxical.’ 
This doctrinal statement could only be true in a metaphysically neutral universe, and so 
from just these four words we can derive the entire metaphysical scheme of Taoism 
and confirm its compatibility with the doctrine of Mahayana Buddhism. In his 
translation and commentary for Fundamental Wisdom Jay Garfield writes, ‘It is this 
sophisticated development of the doctrine of the two truths as a vehicle for 
understanding Buddhist metaphysics and epistemology that is Nagarjuna’s greatest 
philosophical contribution.’6  
 
                                                        
6 Garfield, Jay, The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way - Nagarjuna’s Mulamadhyamakakarika. OUP 
(1995).    
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Nagarjuna’s dual-aspect doctrine is a vehicle for understanding and not a form of 
dualism. The true principle or original phenomenon would be nondual, and it would be 
for didactic reasons only that it is spoken of as dual. Considered as dualism his theory 
would clearly be nonreductive. Insofar as it suggests that the universe is divided into 
two worlds it might be viewed as a mystic equivalent for Chalmers’ naturalistic 
dualism, a double-aspect (psycho-physical) theory of information remarkably similar to 
Buddhism’s two worlds doctrine and requiring few modifications to be compatible 
with it. Neither theory claims that dualism is true, it is just that both take advantage of 
it for pragmatic reasons. Logic finds dualism absurd at the limit, whether it is of Mind 
and Matter, Something and Nothing, Being and non-Being or any other contradictory 
and complementary pair of categories, as we have stated in Proposition a), since 
problems of self-reference arise. Chalmers proposes, and it is a common view in 
Buddhism, that a nonreductive theory, one which puts this foundational problem aside 
for the time being, may nevertheless provide a useful framework within which to 
research and discuss the issues.        
 
At the limit, however, the universe must be a unity of some sort or there is no such 
thing. For naturalistic dualism this unity is implied but absent, as it will be for any 
Mind-Matter-only theory, a missing ingredient or explanatory gap. Such theories must 
treat Mind and Matter as irreducible categories. In this way the metaphysical problems 
arising for dualism may be swept under the carpet and there is some justification for 
calling this form of dualism ‘naturalistic’. For a metaphysically neutral theory, 
however, Mind and Matter would be mutually-dependent epiphenomena and an all-
embracing unity would take the leading role. The meta-system would be all. The Mind-
Matter distinction would be emergent, in some sense of this word, and this would be 
why human reasoning indicates that neither is original.    
 
For the Buddhist and Taoist, as for Kant and Hegel, wherever categorical distinctions 
are reified, applied to the universe as a whole, they would be psychological or 
philosophical errors. Hegel calculated this, for the universe must be a unity if all 
selective conclusions about it are absurd, there could be no other explanation. For 
Nagarjuna, however, and contrary to Carnap, this result would be not only be 
calculable in philosophy but also empirically verifiable. It would be empirically 
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verifiable because the universe would be metaphysically neutral. A doctrine of unity 
allows the possibility of such knowledge, for it would be from this original unity that 
our individual consciousness arises, or appears to arise, and that maintains it from 
moment to moment, and from which it can never be separated. Thus Imam Ali, the first 
Shia Imam, asks, ‘Dost thou reckon thyself only a puny form, when within thee the 
universe is enfolded?’ Far away and many centuries earlier Lao-tsu writes, ‘Since 
before time and space were, the Tao is. It is beyond is and is not. How do I know this 
is true? I look inside myself and see.’  
 
These are astonishing claims. Yet it is not impossible to make some sense of them in 
philosophy. Neither would be inconsistent with Kant’s proposal that if we look inside 
ourself we will eventually find a phenomenon that is not an instance of a category, nor 
with his further proposal that the universe as a whole is not an instance of a category. 
A priori there could only be one phenomenon that is not an instance of a category, and 
a synthesis of psychology and cosmology is clearly implied. From Kant, therefore, it is 
only a small step to Hegel’s spiritual unity, Lao-tsu’s Tao, Ali’s enfolded universe, a 
neutral metaphysical position and the theory of emptiness. Far from being the opposite 
of Kant’s rational psychology the psychological scheme of mysticism might be derived 
from it. Mysticism makes far grander knowledge claims, even that it is possible to 
know what is prior to the psycho-physical universe, but such claims would not 
contradict Kant’s philosophical results and might even shed light on them.      
 
To see why true words must seem paradoxical for Lao-tsu’s view we could imagine 
we have been outside and verified that it is raining by getting wet. Under these 
conditions we would normally judge the statement, ‘It is raining’ to be exactly true,  
and in the natural language of our everyday psycho-physical world of rain and wetness, 
where all we mean by these words is that it is raining as opposed to not-raining, it 
would be exactly true. For a neutral metaphysical position, however,  there would be a 
sense in which this statement would be false, for we would have to take into account 
the ultimate unreality of such phenomena. The statement ‘It is raining’ leaves 
something out and could never be the whole truth.  At the same time we cannot simply 
reverse our judgement and say, ‘It is not raining,’ for this would also be inadequate. 
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Accordingly, in metaphysics at least, we would have to say something like, ‘It is 
raining and not-raining.’  
 
It follows that for a saying which seems ‘mystical’ all we would need to do is state 
something about the universe as a whole that would not imply a positive metaphysical 
position.  A famous case in philosophy would be Heraclitus’ existential assertion, ‘We 
are and are-not.’ Armed with Nagarjuna’s theory we need not, with Plato and 
Aristotle, who according to Whittaker may have learnt of Heraclitus’ ideas from a talk 
given by a student, immediately conclude that Heraclitus had abandoned his reason, 
nor even, I hope to show, that he had abandoned any of the latter’s three rules for the 
dialectic. We need only interpret his words as indicating a metaphysical position for 
which on their own the statements ‘we are’ and ‘we are not’ would be unrigorous and 
inadequate.   
 
That the universe is a unity having only complementary and contradictory aspects is a 
necessary condition for a neutral metaphysical position. The idea is found in all the 
principal traditions of mysticism, albeit not often in the clear and explicit form it takes 
in Buddhism after Nagarjuna. Even so, it is quite easy to track it through the literature 
of the various traditions and in this way confirm their common metaphysic. ‘They do 
not understand that the all-One, conflicting in itself, is identical with itself: conflicting 
harmony as in the bow and the lyre,’ says Heraclitus. His Janus-faced ‘all-One’ appears 
again as Jung’s Mysterium Conjiunctionis, the state of unus mundus which for the 
Alchemists is the third and final stage in the union of the individual with reality. We 
meet it again in G. S. Brown’s Laws of Form, the underlying thesis of which is that the 
psychophysical universe, including space and time, arises from a pristine unity by a 
process of category-making or symmetry-breaking. To our senses and intellect this 
unity, like Heidegger’s Being, must be featureless or transparent, the absence of 
everything, the desert of the real, a conceptual Void, an Abyss, in psychology the 
metaphorical Chasm that provides the final test of courage for Indiana Jones in 
Spielberg’s treatment of the Grail mythology. But it would be both an absence and a 
presence. In his Seven Sermons to the Dead  the gnostic Jung speaks in words of 
which Lao-tsu would surely have approved.   
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Nothing is the same as fullness. In the endless state fullness is the same as emptiness. The 
Nothing is both empty and full. One may just as well state some other thing about the 
Nothing, namely that it is white or that it is black or that is exists or that it exists not. That 
which is endless and eternal has no qualities, because it has all qualities.7      
 
In the literature of mysticism it matters not where we look, we keep meeting the same 
uncategorisable phenomenon, and always we find ourselves struggling with a language 
of paradox and contradiction. It is quite easy to verify by experiment that when we 
rigorously avoid all positive metaphysical positions we have no choice but to speak in 
riddles. This causes intense problems for communication in discussions of mysticism, 
but as a symptom of a worldview it is useful to us here. It means that it is not usually 
difficult to spot metaphysical neutralism wherever it appears.  
 
Beautiful Painted Arrow, a shaman of the Ute and Pueblo Indians, tells us that in his 
tradition human beings may be conscious in two ways, or have access to two states of 
being.8 In translation these would be ‘Believing We Exist’ and ‘Awakened Awareness,’ 
phrases it would be easy to translate as ‘Samsara’ and ‘Nirvana,’ the states with which 
Nagarjuna’s two worlds are often (but not always) equated, or as corresponding to the 
states of ‘ignorance’ and ‘enlightenment’ spoken of by the Buddha. We might expect 
the opposite of ‘believing we exist’ to be ‘believing we do not exist’ but an alternative 
is implied, a resolution of Heraclitus’ contradiction. We find the idea of a unity prior to 
all distinctions in theistic and atheistic traditions alike, it is only that the terminology 
changes. Here is Dionysus the Areopagite from The Mystical Theology, followed by a 
traditional Zen teaching story. In both we see the rejection of positive metaphysical 
positions.   
 
. . . [H]e possesses all the positive attributes of the universe (being the Universal Cause), yet, 
in a more strict sense, He does not possess them, since He transcends them all; wherefore 
there is no contradiction between the affirmations and negations, inasmuch as he infinitely 
precedes all conceptions of deprivation, being beyond all positive and negative distinctions. 
 
 
                                                        
7 VII Sermones ad Moruos. In S. A. Hoeller (Trans) The Gnostic Jung and the Seven Sermons to the Dead, 
Wheaton, Illinois: Theosophical Publishing House (1982) 
8 Joseph E. Rael, Beautiful Painted Arrow, Element Books (1992) 
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Yamaoka Tesshu, as a young student of Zen, visited one master after another. He called upon 
Dokuon of Shokoku. Desiring to show his attainment, he said: "The mind, Buddha, and 
sentient beings, after all, do not exist. The true nature of phenomena is emptiness. There is no 
realisation, no delusion, no sage, no mediocrity. There is no giving and nothing to be 
received." 
 
Dokuon, who was smoking quietly, said nothing. Suddenly he whacked Yamaoka with his 
bamboo pipe. This made the youth quite angry. 
 
"If nothing exists," inquired Dokuon, "where did this anger come from?" 
 
At first glance Nagarjuna’s theory divides the world into two categories. While it 
might appear to be a dual-aspect theory of information along the lines of Chalmers’ 
naturalistic dualism it would differ in that the two basic categories would not be Mind 
and Matter but the two halves of a more basic distinction. In Chalmers’ terms this 
would be more like the distinction we make between information and information 
space, where Mind and Matter would belong in the former category. In this regard 
Schrödinger, an ardent proponent for over forty years of the nondual cosmology, 
speaks of the contents of consciousness and ‘the canvas on which they are painted.’9 
Or it may be a deeper distinction, it is hard to be sure. At any rate, as we have seen, 
this is not be just another form of nonreductive dualism, for whatever these final two 
categories are they would be reducible. For the Buddhist philosopher the phrase 
‘naturalistic dualism’ would be an oxymoron. Dualism would not be naturalistic. Only 
a true doctrine could be naturalistic.  Information and information space would not be 
categorically distinct phenomena, there could be no such thing, but would comprise yet 
another Hegelian distinction or Kantian antinomy to be transcended on the path to 
unity, whether in logico-mathematical analysis or in experience. The Middle Way 
doctrine is reductionist with a vengeance. By reduction all distinctions, even that 
between Samsara and Nirvana, would be category errors.  ‘I have put duality away. I 
have seen that the two worlds are one,’ writes the Persian poet and Sufi adept 
Jalaluddin Rumi of this final reduction. For the Grail scholar Joseph Campbell the 
Kingdom of the Grail is, ‘To be achieved only by one capable of transcending the 
painted wall of space-time with its foul and fair, good and evil, true and false display of 
                                                        
9 Schrödinger, Erwin,  Mind and Matter, Cambridge University Press, (1992)  
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the names and forms of merely phenomenal pairs of opposites.’10  For the Kabbalist it 
would be only through the transcendence of the discriminating intellect in experience 
that the Unity of God spoken of in the Shema of the Jewish liturgy is revealed.  
 
If a phenomenon is defined as ‘unconditioned’ or ‘beyond the categories’ then clearly 
it cannot simply exist or not-exist. For a theory of information consistent with 
Buddhism’s theory of emptiness, therefore, the unity to which information and 
information space reduce would lie not only beyond the mind-matter distinction but 
even beyond the existence/non-existence distinction. Only with this unconditioned 
phenomenon would a reductionist analysis of the universe finally end. This could be 
viewed as a strong epiphenomenalism for which mental and corporeal phenomena 
would be emergent and just one phenomenon truly real.         
 
Kant’s reluctance to equate the subject of rational psychology with the universe as a 
whole, despite their conceptually identical nature and properties, (the inevitable 
voidness of any concept of a phenomenon beyond categorisation), has awkward 
consequences for his cosmology. He is forced to the idea that space-time phenomena 
are empirically real but transcendentally ideal, where a transcendentally ideal 
phenomenon is an idea and in this sense unreal.  Such phenomena would be empirically 
real and logically unreal. For the Madyamika philosopher this view would be incorrect, 
just as the contradiction implies. Kant concludes that reality has two aspects, and to 
this extent he and Nagarjuna are in agreement. Nagarjuna, however, offers a different 
solution. He proposes that space-time phenomena are conventionally real but both 
logically and empirically unreal, where a conventionally real phenomena would be a 
conceptual imputation. Here there is no contradiction. On the issue of what empiricism 
can tell us about the reality of space-time phenomena, then, the two philosophers do 
not agree, taking directly opposing positions. They agree that from logical analysis we 
must conclude that space-time phenomena are in some sense real and unreal at the 
same time, that their reality is somehow dependent on our point of view, but once Kant 
has denied an identity between the parts, (the categorizable), and the whole, (the 
uncategorizable),  he cannot make his double-aspect theory work. He makes an 
                                                        
10 Campbell, Joseph, The Masks of God: Creative Mythology, (Viking Press, 1968) 
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assumption about the limits of empiricism and the reality of phenomena that leads him 
to the view that the unreality of spacetime phenomena cannot be empirically verified, 
and this renders his view paradoxical. Reason would lead us to one conclusion and 
empiricism would lead us to its opposite. But common-sense suggests that reason and 
empiricism should not lead us to two directly opposing conclusions about the reality of 
tables and chairs. For Nagarjuna they would lead us to the same conclusion, that 
space-time and all it contains are conceptual imputations. These phenomena would 
reduce to sunyata or emptiness, and this would be both demonstrable in logic and 
empirically verifiable. Logic and ontology would coincide. For Kant logic would 
outrun empiricism. For Nagarjuna it would be the other way around, but logic would 
not mislead us.  
 
In much the same way Kant goes as far as placing the origin of sentience beyond the 
categories of thought but does not go on to infer that individual experiencers must 
therefore have empirical access to a world beyond the categories, beyond the distinct 
mundane and transcendent worlds, beyond experience and experiencer, is and is-not, 
knower and known, perceiver and perceived, appearance and reality, existence and 
non-existence, subject and object and so forth. Yet this is clearly implied. Körner 
summarises Kant’s view. 11    
 
In the Analytic of Concepts Kant has drawn a sharp distinction between the ‘I think which 
must be capable of all my presentations,’ thereby giving them synthetic unity, and the 
empirical, introspective, self which is itself a presentation. To be truly a priori rational 
psychology must have for its subject the former, i.e. the self of pure self-consciousness. This 
however is not, according to Kant, an object of experience and so of the applicability of the 
Categories. It is not an instance of any Category. 
 
Perhaps Fundamental Wisdom could be read as an attempt to demonstrate what Kant 
came so close to concluding, that the psychological and physical universe can be 
reduced to a phenomenon that is not an instance of any category and to which all 
beings with a psychology have immediate access. We cannot say what this phenomena 
is since natural language is inherently dualistic and forces us to predicate and thus to 
                                                        
11 Körner, S, Kant, (Pelican Books, 1955)   
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categorize. All predication must be part of the conventional or lower world, or aspect 
of the world, and will fail where we speak of the world as a whole. A predicate is a 
selective conclusion and cannot be legitimately attached to a phenomenon that is 
unconditioned. Here would be part of the reason why Lao-tsu states, ‘The Tao that is 
eternal cannot be talked.’ Predication is necessary for a conventional description of 
phenomena, but impossible where the subject is defined as not an instance of any 
category. Nevertheless, Lao-tsu goes on, ‘The Tao must be talked.’ As he 
demonstrates so well, however, we would have to speak of it apophatically or in a 
language of contradictory complementarity. Thus, for example, we might say that Tao 
is an instance of a category that is not an instance of a category, for there are always 
two ways we can think about it. What it actually is we cannot think or say.          
 
Predication is the very basis of language according to Nietzsche and others, and it 
seems true for all but the most primitive system of grunts. For language we are forced 
to separate subject and predicate, essence and attribute, particular and universal, set 
and member of set and so forth, and in this way are forced into dualism. In everyday 
life this linguistic dualism is appropriate and indispensable, and it is the very basis of set 
theory. Its use in philosophy, however, leads to the reification of distinctions and thus 
the adoption of positive metaphysical positions. For a neutral position we must avoid 
dualism in any of its forms. Echoing Bradley’s remark quoted at the head of this essay 
regarding the use of the term ‘unity’, his injunction that the Real cannot properly be 
called ‘one’, the Sufi sage Al Halaj warns that it is unrigorous to claim that God is 
One, since ‘Whoso testifyeth that God is One thereby setteth up another beside Him,’12 
namely his own individual self as testifier. These are the traps of language. Hence the 
metaphysically neutral interpretation of the Hindu Upanishads expounded by 
Radhakrishnan in his Philosophy of the Upanishads is characterised as advaita, a term 
which means ‘not-two,’  but which, we are regularly reminded, should not be taken to 
mean ‘one.’ We would naturally attempt to conceive of a unity as something that is 
numerically one, but this would be a mistake for the original unity spoken of in 
mysticism, which would not be an instance of a numerical category. In his unfinished 
book A Guess at the Riddle Peirce notes, ‘We can easily recognise the man whose 
                                                        
12 In Baldock, John, The Essence of Sufism, (Arcturus Publishing, 2004) 
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thought is mainly in the dual stage by his unmeasured use of language.’ In order to talk 
about Tao we must assign it predicates, as we have done here by the use of the word 
‘it.’ Yet in no case can we say that ‘it’ is this as opposed to that, or even that as 
opposed to me. Bradley speaks of this problem when he writes that in metaphysics, 
‘The separation of the predicate from the subject seems at once to be necessary and yet 
indefensible.’13 Thus for Buddhist philosophy we must choose whether to speak from a 
conventional perspective, from which perspective this separation is necessary and 
legitimate, or from an ultimate perspective, from where it is impossible. To speak from 
the ultimate perspective is made possible only by the unsatisfactory method of 
regularly denying whatever is affirmed, and even this is said to be inadequate.    
 
Having made a first sketch of what a neutral metaphysical position is and perhaps lent 
a little plausibility to the claim that mysticism depends on such a position, it is almost 
time to investigate Proposition b). Just before that, however, let us return to 
Proposition a) to deal with a loose end.  There is one metaphysical position that is not 
eliminated from our enquiry by Proposition a). This is Dialethism. That the universe 
disobeys the rules of Aristotle’s logic is an axiom for Dialethism, and if Proposition a) 
is true this lends it credibility. Being neither a neutral nor positive metaphysical 
position it balances precariously on the ancient and increasingly rickety fence between 
the stereotypically ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ kinds of philosophy, in some ways serving 
as a useful bridge between them. As noted earlier, even if we concede that all positive 
metaphysical positions are logically indefensible we are not actually forced by 
abductive reasoning to adopt a neutral position. There remains one other possibility, 
which is that the universe does not conform to any logically defensible metaphysical 
position. This is what Dialethism claims.  
 
For Dialethism the first proposition of our argument would be true and the second 
false. All positive metaphysical positions would be self-contradictory and false, such 
that all selective conclusions about the world as a whole would be undecidable. This 
would be explained not by the idea of an Hegelian unity or Kantian metasystem in 
which all categories are exposed as errors, however, but by positing the existence of 
                                                        
13 Bradley, Francis, Appearance and Reality, (Oxford University Press, 1951)  
 26
true contradictions. The universe would be paradoxical, such that an accurate 
description of it would be logically absurd. Here is the loophole in Nagarjuna’s 
argument. He proves Proposition a) but does not directly address the possibility that 
the universe disobeys the rules of his proof. In logic there is no direct way to rule out 
this possibility.    
 
Graham Priest has proposed that Dialethism, a term that translates roughly as ‘two 
truths’, is not a new philosophy but merely a new name, and that it was probably 
endorsed by Heraclitus, Nicolas of Cusa and Hegel.14 These philosophers are given a 
different interpretation here, but this interpretative disagreement does at least show the 
similarity of our positions. Dialethism and the doctrine of mysticism share important 
features, and in his Paradoxical Nature of the Universe Melhuish has shown that their 
logical schemes are almost isomorphic.   
 
At least one of them must be false, however, or not entirely true. This is because for 
mysticism the universe would not be paradoxical. It would only appear to be 
paradoxical. There would be no true contradictions. This is exactly what Nagarjuna 
and Bradley prove. Paradoxes depend on distinctions, while for mysticism we would 
have to extend our ontology, epistemology and psychology to include a phenomenon 
that is beyond Cusa’s coincidentia oppositorum, beyond the conflicting harmony of 
Heraclitus’s bow and lyre, beyond Lao-tsu’s is and is-not, beyond Chalmers’ mind and 
matter, and beyond any possible contradiction. The Holy Grail of Christian and pre-
Christian legend is said to have the power to dissolve all distinctions. Here we would 
find, whether in logic or practice, a phenomenon that is uncategorizable, a 
phenomenon that is not Nothing but which to the intellect is of necessity void, an 
unconditioned element, the transcendent principle which for Kabbalism is prior even to 
God. As Hegel’s Absolute Idea this would be the culmination of philosophical 
thinking, the phenomenon that allows the final reduction necessary for a fundamental 
theory, the transcendence of the dialectic by a sublation of all categories to reveal a 
pristine unity. This would be the original unity that allows Brown to overcome 
Cantor’s set-theoretic paradox where Frege and Russell could not, and thus to be able 
                                                        
14 Priest, Graham, Dialetheism, (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, online)        
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to describe the universe within a formal calculus without paradox. As Bradley’s ‘Real’ 
this unity cannot be called ‘one’, but it would be possible ‘to use unity with a different 
meaning.’ Among the multitude of phenomena painstakingly catalogued in Buddhism’s 
Abhidhamma pitaka, or ‘basket’ of teachings, where the Buddha’s underlying ontology 
is framed in terms of bare ontological factors called dhammas, this one alone is 
undefined, the only one not evanescent and subject to conditions.       
 
It may be important to note that for the Mahayana Buddhist this is a phenomenon and 
not just a mythological entity or explanatory device. In Buddhist phenomenology the 
term dhamma, which would include all mental and corporeal ‘things’ or ‘thing-events’, 
all that would be ‘information’ for Chalmers’ naturalistic dualism, may be rendered as 
‘phenomenon’ just as long as this term is not thought of as implying a correlative 
‘noumenon’. Nibbana, the unconditioned element, is spoken of as one of these 
dhammas, and it appears in the Abhidhamma literature in the ‘Enumeration of 
Phenomena’ in several of the classificatory groups. This phenomenon, however, would 
be supramundane and not included in the realms of conditioned existence. In his 
Abhidhamma Studies - Buddhist Explorations of Consciousness and Time, 
Nyanaponika Thera writes,  
 
‘Though Nibbana …, does in fact appear quite often in the Dhammasangani, it should be 
noted that: (1) In all cases it is merely mentioned without any further explanation beyond the 
classificatory heading under which it appears, and so it differs in that respect from the other 
“things,” to all of which a definition is added; (2) the classifications of Nibbana are all 
negative in character. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that Nibbana is definitely termed a 
dhamma, …’   
 
A phenomenon lying beyond the categories is an unavoidable implication of a neutral 
metaphysical  position. It is denied by all positive metaphysical positions and also by 
Dialethism. Nevertheless, for Dialethism the universe would be metaphysically neutral 
in a way, or up to a point. Positive metaphysical positions would be false and logically 
indefensible and this would render all selective conclusions about the universe as a 
whole undecidable. As a consequence we would require a logic of contradictory 
complementarity or two truths for an adequate description of the universe as a whole 
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or to speak the whole truth about it. A selective description of the universe would be 
partial and inadequate, and in no case would we be able to say that the universe is this 
as opposed to that without abandoning rigour. For an assertion that would still be 
inadequate but might be slightly less misleading we would have to say that the universe 
is both this and that or neither this nor that. About much of this the dialethist and the 
mystic can agree. For the latter, however, all opposing views would have to be 
sublated for the truth, exposed as category errors. The universe would have all 
attributes and no attributes, or this would be the two complementary ways we can 
think about it, but neither would be the fundamental view. It would be just that two 
contradictory half-truths is the best the discursive intellect and natural language can do 
to represent the situation. The same problem would arise for any kind of 
representation. The Yin-Yang symbol denies the clear-cut contradictions we are forced 
into by language but does not entirely avoid an implied metaphysical dualism. Nor 
would a language of contradiction and paradox, for while by its use we can approach a 
step closer to the truth than is possible in natural language it could never take us all the 
way. The Tao that is eternal cannot be talked and in philosophy, where it must be 
talked, we would have to be content with a language that points in its direction. The 
dialethist would disagree here and say that this language points nowhere but simply 
reflects the paradoxical nature of the universe. He or she might agree that assertions 
about the universe as a whole must take the form of pairs of contradictory and 
complementary half-truths, but would not agree that this language points beyond itself 
to a profound unity. They would certainly reject the idea that when Meister Eckhart 
says, ‘Why does thou prate of God? Whatever thou sayest of Him is untrue,’ it might 
be in part this problem he is talking about, as also the idea that what we are examining 
here is the origin of the Biblical and Quoranic warnings about the dangers of idolising 
the Ultimate.          
 
For Dialethism true words would not just seem paradoxical, they would actually be so. 
The universe would be absent the undefined meta-psychophysical phenomenon on 
which Nagarjuna’s solution for the problems of philosophy depends, and its absence 
would render the universe paradoxical and incomprehensible. There would be an 
ingredient missing. Far from being a reasonable theory Dialethism states that all 
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reasonable theories are false. This is the position we will be forced to adopt if we find 
that the first proposition of our syllogism is true and the second is false.   
 
We must note that Proposition b) would not render Dialethism false. It states, or this 
would be its implication, that Dialethism is ad hoc. This is as much as it can state. 
Logic alone could never force us to believe that the universe is or is not paradoxical. It 
can prove nothing about reality. Even if we were able to rigorously demonstrate that 
Propositions a) and b) are true we would not have refuted any doctrine for which the 
universe is paradoxical. Our first proposition would render all positive positions absurd 
and the second would render all absurd positions redundant. This is a weakness in our 
argument, that we cannot quite dismiss Dialethism, but it seems unlikely that many 
people would want to exploit it. As Bradley notes, as long we are committed to the 
idea that the universe is reasonable then the first two propositions of our argument will 
imply the third. Given the truth of Proposition a) and the self-proclaimed logical 
indefensibility of Dialethism, then if a neutral metaphysical position is logically 
defensible the case is closed. If Proposition b) is demonstrably true, or not 




Part III  
 
Anything that contradicts experience and logic should be abandoned. 
 
The Dalai Lama 
The Little Book of Buddhism 
 
 
Given the truth of our first proposition there are four possible outcomes for an 
investigation into the truth of the second, two of which are equivalent.       
  
1. We find that b) is demonstrably true. It would be premature to claim that 
the truth of c) would follow from this, since the argument as stated is 
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simple and clear at the expense of formality and rigour. The truth of c) 
would follow if the argument can be made valid and rigorous.  
  
2. We find that Proposition b) is demonstrably undecidable. In this case it is 
demonstrably true. 
  
3. We find that Proposition b) is demonstrably false. In this case all 
metaphysical positions are logically indefensible and the universe is 
demonstrably unreasonable. The truth or unfalsifiability of Proposition a) 
and the demonstrable falsity of Proposition b) could be explained only by 
assuming that there are true contradictions. The doctrine of mysticism 
would be logically indefensible and something like Dialethism would have 
to be true.   
  
4. We find that b) is undecidable in practice but that its undecidability cannot 
be demonstrated in philosophy. This would be not so much a result as a 
predicament, one we could never know we are in. If we cannot show that 
this proposition is false, true or undecidable, and cannot even show that 
this is our situation, then it will always be reasonable to argue, with 
Nagarjuna and Bradley, that a) directly implies c). It is just that this 
conclusion could never be forced on us. It would always remain a 
possibility that b) is false. Logical reasoning alone would allow us to 
establish no more than what Nagarjuna and Bradley establish by its use, 
which is that a) is true and c) might be. 
 
Let us now examine whether a neutral metaphysical position would be logically 
defensible. As Lao-tsu notes, the claims that this cosmological scheme makes about the 
world may appear to be ‘illogical’ or self-contradictory, and it would be easy to 
conclude that it simply must be logically indefensible, that it must be quite easy to 
reduce it to absurdity in the dialectic. Even within mysticism we find the view that the 
universe would transgress the rules of classical logic. Nagarjuna’s logical refutation of 
positive metaphysical positions asks us to reconsider this view. The logic he employs 
for the task is no different from Aristotle’s, and unless his own position is impregnable 
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his argument fails. This logic requires no modification to accommodate his two worlds 
doctrine. Indeed, his argument can be interpreted as a proof that a neutral metaphysical 
position would be consistent with Aristotelian logic. He may have seen no logical 
reason not to step immediately from the absurdity of all positive metaphysical positions 
to the conclusion that his Middle Way doctrine is true.              
 
But this is a very big step, and in a strictly inferential philosophy we cannot take it 
unless we must. This is especially true here, where a neutral metaphysical position is 
mysticism. To know whether we are forced to take this step we would have to decide 
Proposition b). It must be decidable, for it makes no claim about the universe, and if it 
is undecidable then it is true. Admittedly, a proposition stating that the linguistic and 
philosophical scheme of Buddhism and Taoism obey the laws of classical logic might 
seem surprising, but unless this is the case then Nagarjuna’s argument fails.       
 
That a neutral position is systematic, and can be represented as a formal system of 
terms and theorems, has been shown by George Spencer Brown in his Laws of Form. 
Russell praised the ‘calculus of indications’ Brown presents us with there, and, 
consistent with the idea that the metaphysical scheme of Buddhism and Taoism is not 
paradoxical, agreed with Brown that it does away with the need for his Theory of 
Types. Brown’s calculus is a model of a metaphysically neutral universe and the 
process by which forms emerge from formlessness. Russell’s famous paradox cannot 
arise for it because the system is emergent from a unity that cannot be characterised as 
container or contained, set or member of set, one or zero, something or nothing. In a 
lecture at the Essaline Institute in the 1960’s Brown likens this axiomatic phenomenon 
to an unmarked piece of paper. Paradoxes of self-reference cannot arise for a 
cosmological doctrine which states that categories are not fundamental. 
Notwithstanding all this, a cosmological doctrine for which true words must seem 
paradoxical and for which all positive metaphysical positions would be false can hardly 
be accused of being unsystematic. But would it pass Aristotle’s test for 
reasonableness?  
 
On this question there is some disagreement even among its proponents and, as usual, 
it may be just a matter of how we look at it. Brown proposes in Laws of Form that a 
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neutral cosmology would require a modification to Aristotelian logic similar to that 
which Heisenberg considered necessary for quantum theory. My impression is that 
most physicists follow Heisenberg and would conclude likewise that the universe 
disobeys the rules of classical logic, forcing on physics a modification to those rules. 
Yet it may be argued that neither Brown’s advaitan cosmology nor Heisenberg’s 
quantum mechanics would require a modification of classical logic, and that this would 
have been Aristotle’s view.  
 
Before examining Aristotle’s view let us first clarify what a neutral metaphysical 
position would imply for logic by reference to cases. At a first glance, and not only at a 
first glance, a neutral metaphysical position might seem to obviously contravene what 
most of us take to be the laws of thought. The mean really does seem ‘illogical’. And 
yet in scholastic philosophy the idea of taking a neutral stance on metaphysical 
dilemmas is a quite common one. As an alternative for the orthodox view it is usually 
there among the solutions for any particular metaphysical problem. Axiomatically it is 
only ever endorsed on a piecemeal basis, on which basis it is found not to work, but in 
a partial form the idea is easy to find. Even the defiantly non-mystical Russell was a 
neutral monist on the Mind-Matter question, allowing the possibility that this is not a 
dilemma after all but a trilemma with a term missing. Much like Kant, however, he 
does not extend this idea to a principle, and so in the end his theory falls foul of the 
One-Many problem and belies its title by ending up in an irreducible plurality of 
indistinguishable neutral entities. He ventures a step beyond ‘naturalistic dualism’ but 
becomes trapped in contradiction and so pulls up short of Nagarjuna and Hegel’s 
fundamental solution. Physicists adopt a neutral position on various dualities and are 
accustomed to dealing with the problems that arise for logic and language, but they do 
not usually extend this idea to the metaphysical underpinnings for their theories, the 
Something-Nothing problem, the closure principle, the background-dependence 
problem and so forth, and so are forced to defend positions which are known to be 
logically indefensible rather as if metaphysics did not exist.     
 
Perhaps those who conjecture that the question of whether space-time is fundamental 
is undecidable are close to adopting a neutral position, for this might suggest that 
spacetime is fundamental or emergent depending on how we look at it, or perhaps on 
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how we define physics. We could say that spacetime is a Kantian initial condition for 
the appearance of the psychophysical phenomena that comprise the exclusive subject 
matter of today’s physics, and fundamental in this sense, but that it would not be a 
necessary condition for the unconditioned phenomenon from which spacetime would 
be emergent. This question must remain forever beyond experimental physics, beyond 
even the intellect, although not beyond all experiment. As a dual-aspect solution 
compatibilism will not work, however, unless it can be generalised into a principle. 
Only then can it be integrated into a systematic philosophical scheme. We must answer 
all metaphysical questions or none at all.   
 
For any translation into physics it is undoubtedly a problem for a neutral metaphysical 
scheme that it would be impossible to observe the unconditioned phenomenon prior to 
spacetime that it predicts. The observer/observed distinction would be impossible in 
practice and indefensible in logic. For a formal description of the universe this 
phenomenon would have to be strictly defined as a largely undefined term. 
Nevertheless, in both physics and philosophy, and most apparently where these strands 
of research intermingle in modern consciousness studies, it could never be a redundant 
entity. It survives Ockham’s razor because it makes its presence so clearly felt by its 
absence. Once this phenomenon is assumed to be a mystical fiction our theories are 
beset on all sides by intellectual dilemmas, ignoramibuses, contradictions, explanatory 
gaps, missing ingredients, antinomies, undecidable questions and other barriers to 
knowledge. Under these circumstances it could never be ad hoc. We may be sceptical 
of Nagarjuna’s solution but we cannot deny the problem. It may be predicted to arise, 
since it is inevitable that for every conceiving observer there will be one inconceivable 
and unobservable phenomenon, namely that which conceives and observes. In order to 
avoid problems of self-reference a formal axiomatic description of the universe would 
require at least one undefined term. Mathematics and logic also tell us this, but 
currently physics does not allow for the possibility of this being the most primitive term 
in the system let alone a real phenomenon. Yet if logic and ontology coincide then it 
must be a real phenomenon, the missing ingredient in, or rather not in, our present 
scientific theories of consciousness.  
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To see how Nagarjuna’s solution would work in practice we can examine any 
metaphysical problem. In respect of logic the story will be the same for each of them. 
One of the most closely studied and clearly delineated is the Internalism-Externalism 
problem, by immediate extension also the Subject-Object or Mind-Matter problem. 
Most philosophers favour one or the other horn of this dilemma and some kind of 
mind-only or matter-only theory. Robert Pepperell has proposed a neutral approach as 
its solution, however, arguing that it is not a dilemma but a trilemma. It would be a 
dilemma only if we assume that there either is or is-not a fundamental distinction 
between our mind and the universe it inhabits.  Of course, there is no denying, and it 
hardly needs saying, it is natural to suppose that there is a fundamental distinction 
between ‘my mind’ and ‘my world’ and extremely difficult to suppose otherwise. All 
the same, the dualistic view to which we commit ourselves makes no sense when 
closely examined. Yet the opposite theory, for which our mind and our world are 
identical, also brings with it intractable intellectual problems. Thus a neutral position 
seems forced on us. Pepperell  writes,  
 
The uncertain relationship between mind and world has of course generated countless finely 
nuanced philosophical arguments. But, put starkly, it seems there are three options: 
 
That the mind and world are distinct. 
That the mind and world are unified. 
That the mind and world are both distinct and unified.  
 
… While there are many powerful arguments in favour of the first two options, it is 
the third which I explore here, and the one I will suggest is most plausible.  
 René Descartes (1596-1650) is often credited with formalising the dualistic distinction 
between thinking substance (res cognitans) and material substance (res extensa); that is, 
between ideas attributable to the mind on the one hand and the material world of bodies and 
objects on the other. 
… Descartes’ reputation as the prototypical dualist, however, does not fairly convey 
the complexity, some would say confusion, of his view on the distinction between mind and 
world. In the synopsis of the Meditations, we read:      
 
… the human mind is shown to be really distinct from the body, and, nevertheless, to 
be so closely conjoined therewith as together to form, as it were, a unity.  
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And again in Mediation VI itself: 
 
Nature teaches me … that I am not only lodged in my body as a pilot in a vessel, but 
that I am besides so intimately conjoined, as it were intermixed with it, that my mind 
and body compose a certain unity.  
 
Despite the hint of qualification, Descartes is quite explicit: The mind and body are both 
‘really distinct’ and united - they are two and one.15 
 
This seems to be approximately the solution offered by Nagarjuna. The idea that there 
could be a middle path between Internalism and Externalism may seem ‘illogical’, and 
yet this is the only alternative to the demonstrable absurdity of these two extreme 
views. It would not be that ‘my mind’ and ‘my world’ are identical, for then they 
would have to be distinct, but that by reduction both would be unreal. That is to say, 
they would be reduced not one to the other, and not by synthesis or admixture, but by 
annihilation. All distinctions would be seen to be conceptual.    
 
If we stray for a moment away from metaphysics and into mysticism proper it becomes 
possible to show the surprisingly close relationship between the views of Pepperell, 
Kant, Decartes and Nagarjuna, and to place the origin of the metaphysical scheme of 
mysticism where it belongs, beyond logic and conjecture in empiricism. In his Taboo of 
Subjectivity: Towards a New Science of Consciousness, Alan Wallace clarifies the 
connection between Peperell’s neutral solution and Kant’s subject of rational 
psychology.   
 
Conceptually unstructured awareness – which is nondual from the phenomena that arise to it 
– is regarded as the ultimate reality, and the realisation of such nondual consciousness is the 
final goal of contemplative practice. In this experience, the very distinction between public, 
external space, in which physical phenomena appear to occur, and private, internal space, in 
which mental phenomena appear to occur, dissolves into a “mysterious space”,” which is the 
very nonduality between the conceptually constructed external and internal spaces. The 
ultimate nature of objective phenomena, therefore, is found to be none other then the ultimate 
nature of subjective phenomena; and that is the nonduality of appearances and awareness. 
                                                        
15 Pepperell, R., & Punt, M.. Screen consciousness: cinema, mind and world. (Consciousness, Literature & the 
Arts, 4, 2006)  
 36
When one achieves perfect realisation of this state, in which there is no longer any difference 
between one’s awareness during and after formal meditation sessions, it is claimed that one’s 
consciousness becomes boundless in terms of the scope of its knowledge, compassion, and 
power. Hence, the contemplative pursuit of such realisation is said to be the most sublime of 
sciences. 
 
Perhaps Descartes, Kant and those who share Wallace’s view are not so far apart on 
this issue as they are usually portrayed. We would expect the views of philosophers to 
converge as roads to Rome and they may often be closer than they appear. Many 
people would vehemently object to the idea, rife among practitioners, that mysticism is 
or ever could be a science, but we see here that it is at least not the opposite of 
empiricism. We see that a neutral metaphysical position solves the Internalism-
Externalism problem, or at least transforms it into a different kind of problem. Perhaps 
it also indicates how for its exponents mysticism can be a metaphysical position, a 
practice, a religion, a science and a way of life all at the same time.            
 
Turning back to metaphysics we can say that for a neutral metaphysical position mind 
and body would be both two and one, different in a sense and identical in another. 
Were they not identical in one way they could not be different in another. Internalism 
and Externalism would be false, but each would be partially true as aspects of the final 
truth. It is not obvious that this idea is reasonable and it is for claims such as this that a 
neutral metaphysical position is often judged to contradict the laws of classical logic, in 
particular Aristotle’s tertium non datur rule. Precisely the same situation would arise in 
respect of all metaphysical problems.  
 
Despite this, for the sake of our argument we must now try to reconcile this position 
with the principles by which we usually judge the reasonableness of philosophical 
theories. For most people these would be the three principles formalised by Aristotle 
for the dialectic. For better or worse we have adopted these principles from the start 
here and are forced to say that wherever a theory, explanation or description of the 
universe requires that we abandon one of these principles we must judge it to be 
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absurd, unreasonable and also, since we are proposing that logic and ontology 




PART IV  
 
 
Very few seek knowledge in this world. Mortal or immortal, few really ask. On the contrary, 
they try to wring from the unknown the answers they have already shaped in their own minds 
– justifications, explanations, forms of consolation without which they can’t go on. To really 
ask is to open the door to the whirlwind. The answer may annihilate the question and the 
questionner. 
 
Anne Rice  
Marius - The Vampire Lestat  
 
Aristotle’s laws for dialectic reasoning are the laws of identity, non-contradiction and 
excluded middle. The law of identity (LI) states that A is A. It need not concern us for 
the moment. The law of non-contradiction (LNC) states that for any A it is impossible 
for both A and ~A to be true. That is to say, if the assertion ‘x is square’ is true, then 
the assertion ‘x is-not square’ cannot also be true. Finally, the law of the excluded 
middle (LEM) states that for any A it is necessary for one of A and ~A to be true. 
Either x is square or it is not, there is no third alternative. Where there is a third 
alternative then A and ~A are not legitimate dialectical propositions.    
 
These latter two laws are simple and clear and we use them with hardly a thought from 
almost the day we are born, regardless of whether we have heard of the dialectic or 
Aristotle. When we go to the cupboard for the marmalade either it is there or it is not. 
We do not expect it to be both in the cupboard and not-in the cupboard. In everyday 
life we are utterly dependent on these principles of reasoning for our moment to 
moment survival. Simple and familiar as they are, however, it is quite easy to 
inadvertently abuse them. Most importantly, where we apply these laws to pairs of 
assertions such as, ‘The marmalade is in the cupboard,’ and ‘The marmalade is-not in 
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the cupboard,’ it would be vital to ensure that A and ~A really are two precisely 
contradictory assertions. If they are not then it would not be legitimate to apply either 
the LNC or the LEM. Logic would allow for both assertions to be true and for both to 
be false. The assertions ‘It is raining,’ and ‘It is foggy,’ for example, would not form a 
contradictory pair of the form A and ~A. Both assertions could be true without this 
breaking the LNC, and both could be false without this breaking the LEM. As a 
consequence the idea that it can be both raining and foggy at the same time or neither 
does not seem paradoxical to us. Only where A and ~A are a true contradictory pair 
could the LNC and LEM be the laws of thought. To know how to apply these laws 
legitimately, therefore, we must be very clear as to what, according to Aristotle, would 
constitute a true contradictory pair of assertions.     
 
Aristotle deals at length with contradictory pairs in De Interpretatione.16 Here, for the 
dialectic, he gives the rule for contradictory pairs, or the formal condition under which 
it is  legitimate to apply the LNC and LEM.  
 
Of every contradictory pair, one member is true and the other false.  
 
From this rule it follows tautologically that unless it is legitimate to apply the LNC and 
LEM to a pair of assertions they are not a true contradictory pair. A metaphysical 
question would be a dilemma only where it asks us to choose one member of a true 
contradictory pair of assertions. Where it does not it would be a category error.     
 
Aristotle gives examples of permissible exceptions to his laws, instances where it 
would not be legitimate to apply them. If we look upon these as illegitimate 
applications of the laws then we can say that the LNC and LEM would be inviolable 
for any rational philosophy and that wherever Aristotle says it is legitimate to apply 
these laws we can allow of no exceptions, transgressions or modifications whatsoever. 
A rational way of reasoning would obey Aristotle’s three laws just so long as they are 
rigorously applied.  
  
                                                        
16 See Whittaker, C. W., Aristotle’s De Interpretatione: Contradiction and Dialectic.  I follow Whittaker’s 
reading of this text throughout and am heavily indebted to him for this part of the discussion.  
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If we take this approach then were we to find Heraclitus’ statement, ‘We are and are 
not’ to be comprised of two contradictory assertions we would have to judge his 
doctrine unreasonable. Not necessarily false, although this would be the implication, 
but contrary to reason. If, on the other hand, his statement would not comprise a true 
contradictory pair then it cannot be refuted in Aristotelian logic and in this sense would 
not be unreasonable. It would simply be a case of it being rainy and foggy at the same 
time, or neither. What we must establish, then, if we are to decide Proposition b), is 
where it would be legitimate to apply Aristotle’s laws and where it would not. 
Heisenberg concludes that the LEM at least must be modified for quantum mechanics, 
and it may seem necessary to modify this law for a neutral metaphysical position. If it 
would be illegitimate to apply it in either case, however,  then it would be unnecessary 
to modify it in either case.  
 
The importance of being able to identify true contradictory pairs stems from their 
essential role in the practice of the dialectic. If we cannot identify such pairs then we 
cannot reason dialectically, and perhaps not even rationally. For a dialectical debate 
one player will propose a thesis and the others would attempt to refute it. They would 
do this by asking a series of questions chosen in such a way as to lead the proposing 
player to contradict himself, and thus to refute his or her own thesis. These two roles 
may be and often are played by the same person, simply in order to get through the 
day. For the refutation to work the questioner must ask only legitimate dialectical 
questions. A dialectical question is one that forces the answerer to assert the truth of 
one member of a contradictory pair of propositions and the falsity of the other. Simply 
put, a dialectical question is one that demands a yes or no answer. To such questions 
the first player is free to answer as they please, and the answer they give must be 
accepted. To refute their thesis we would not challenge their answers but use them to 
derive a self-contradiction revealing the absurdity of their position. Nagarjuna’s and 
Bradley’s method for refuting positive metaphysical positions is dialectical in this 
sense.17 Both show that for any positive metaphysical position there is a series of 
dialectical  questions by which it can be reduced to absurdity. Proposition b) states that 
                                                        
17 The practice of dialectical debate is a part of the core curriculum for the Tibetan universities. In philosophy, 
the Dalai Lama remarks, ‘there can be no progress without contradiction.’  
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it would be impossible to refute a neutral metaphysical position in this way, and that in 
this sense it is logically defensible.     
 
Aristotle warns us against combining assertions into pairs for which it is not the case 
that one member is true and the other false. In such cases the answerer cannot be 
expected to provide an answer. The answerer would have to assert that one member of 
the pair is true and the other false while knowing this is not the case. ‘Have you 
stopped beating your wife?’ would be an over-worked example. Category-errors are 
fatal to the system, as we see when we ask ‘Is the marmalade in the jar or the 
cupboard?’      
 
Heraclitus’ assertion, ‘We are and are not,’ therefore, may or may not break the laws 
for rational thinking, depending on what he meant. It might look as if it must, but if we 
assume that he shared Nagarjuna’s double-aspect view of reality, for which nothing 
really exists, then this statement would contain a complementary pair of assertions. It 
would be partly true that ‘we are’ and partly true that ‘we are not’, while if we simply 
state ‘we are’ or ‘we are not’ then we would be adopting an absurd positive 
metaphysical position. His assertion would state no more than that it is not exactly true 
to say either ‘we are’ or ‘we are not’. There would be no contradictory pair, just two 
false assertions combined so as to point beyond themselves to a more subtle truth, the 
need to sublate these contradictory ideas for the final truth. Clearly these two 
assertions cannot form a contradictory pair if his thesis is that neither of them is true. 
In metaphysics these two propositions are usually considered mutually exclusive and as 
exhausting the possibilities, but this is not a view forced on us by logic. Rather, as Kant 
and so many others have found, logic suggests this is an incorrect view. In logic the 
illogical mean will always seem more plausible than the absurdity of the extremes.   
 
There is another condition a contradictory pair of assertions must meet before it would 
be legitimate to enforce Aristotle’s rules. Aristotle tells us that the negation of an 
assertion must be internal to it, such that one statement must assert a combination of 
subject and predicate and the other their separation. Whittaker explains:   
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For Aristotle, negation is internal to a sentence. An affirmation claims that two elements, 
denoted by two words, are combined. In ‘Socrates sits,’ for example, it is asserted that 
Socrates and sitting cohere as a single compound entity. A negation makes the opposite claim 
about the same simple elements: that is, it represents them as separated rather than as 
combined. In an affirmation, it is the verb that signifies the combination of subject and 
predicate, and so makes an assertion into a claim that something holds of something else, 
rather than a mere list. Since it is the verb which expresses the combination of subject and 
predicate, it is the verb which must be negated if they are to be represented instead as divided. 
As ‘is’ expresses a combination, so ‘is not’ expresses a separation. The process of negation, 
then, involves going to the heart of the assertion, rather than treating the assertion as an 
atom, and affixing the negation sign to the outside.  
 
He considers the situation for the sentence, ‘Man is just.’  
 
We find that other words in the sentence may also be negated, as in ‘not-man’ or ‘not-just,’ 
but an assertion will only be a negation if the verb or copula itself is negated. So, the negation 
‘man is-not just’ must be distinguished from the affirmation ‘man is not-just.’ One asserts a 
combination between man and not-just, while the other asserts a separation between man and 
just: thus, one is an affirmation and the other is a negation, and, since the two assertions do 
not both cite the same predicate, they must belong to different contradictory pairs.       
 
Hence the assertions, ‘An electron is a wave’ and ‘An electron is a particle’ would not 
form a true contradictory pair. Each would belong to a different pair, and the rules for 
the dialectic would need no modification for a theory stating that electrons have both 
or neither of these properties. Hegel would say that these two concepts, a particle and 
a wave, if we mean an unextended point and an infinitely extended field, are equivalent 
or co-dependent. One is impossible without the other, as we can verify by a thought 
experiment. We can imagine an infinitely small point to just the same extent that we 
can imagine an infinitely large space containing it. The two concepts are 
complementary, a single concept comprised of two aspects, each dependent on the 
other for its existence. For the truth we would have to look beyond this apparent 
contradiction. Aristotle’s laws would not fall apart just because quantum mechanics is 
very strange. He covered all the eventualities. The correct negation for the affirmation 
‘An electron is a wave’ would be ‘An electron is-not a wave.’ Consequently, we can 
assert that an electron is both a wave and a particle or neither a wave nor a particle, 
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and neither assertion can be reduced to absurdity in logic. They are reasonable ideas 
even if they seem incomprehensible.      
 
To summarise, if we are to show that a neutral metaphysical position would give rise 
to contradictary assertions about the universe such as to render it logically indefensible 
or ‘unreasonable’, then first we must show that these contradictory assertions would 
qualify as true contradictory pairs and are not just mismatched assertions that could 
lawfully both be true or false. At the very least we would have to be sure that the truth 
of one or both of them is being asserted. As we have seen, however, for a neutral 
metaphysical position this will never be the case. This renders it irrefutable in the 
dialectic.  
 
If the professors at Butler’s Colleges of Unreason see the ‘middle way’ solution for 
philosophical dilemmas as ‘illogical,’ this can only be on the grounds that it would 
require a modification to Aristotelian logic. If it actually broke the laws then it would 
be no less absurd than the other two solutions, and if it required no modification of 
them then it would not be illogical. This view, that the ‘illogical mean’ is the solution 
for metaphysical dilemmas is sustainable because we cannot demonstrate that it is not. 
True or false, it is a view that logic cannot refute. The idea that this solution is illogical 
rather than downright absurd may be enough to allow it to survive in philosophy 
departments as a curiosity, but it is clearly not enough to make it plausible. What 
would make it plausible is if Butler’s professors are wrong, as Proposition b) claims. 
For Nagarjuna there would be no such thing as a philosophical dilemma and so no 
modification to ordinary logic or recourse to ‘illogic’ would be required to solve one. 
They would seem to be dilemmas only when we ignore Aristotle’s rules. These rules 
are regularly overlooked. In dialectic logic when we ask whether the universe begins 
with Something or Nothing we would be breaking them. The true contradiction would 
be between Something and not-Something, or between Nothing and not-Nothing. If, 
therefore, we answer ‘no’ to the Something-Nothing question, our answer would be 
paradoxical or illogical only in the sense that it is impossible to imagine a phenomenon 
that is not unambiguously a member of one or the other category. This failure of 
imagination has no bearing on the formal reasonableness or even the plausibility of our 
answer. If we take this approach to the problems of philosophy then it would be 
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Nagarjuna’s solution for them, and the reason why it survives the Aristotelian 
argument he makes against all other solutions.    
 
If this is a correct analysis then there is nothing paradoxical about Pepperell’s proposal 
that Internalism and Externalism are false. The proposition that Mind-only and Matter-
only metaphysical theories are false cannot be refuted in logic, and it would explain the 
inconclusiveness of the debate in traditional metaphysics and modern consciousness 
studies. The conclusion Pepperell draws from this cannot be refuted just as long as we 
apply the laws of logic more carefully than we normally need to in everyday life, when 
hunting for the marmalade say, or even than we do for much of metaphysics, and more 
as we would for quantum mechanics or Dialethism. If a neutral metaphysical position 
seems incomprehensible that is another matter. If the difficulty of making sense of 
Nagarjuna’s doctrine does bear on its plausibility then it probably lends it some. ‘The 
we way have to describe Nature is incomprehensible to us,’ Feynman remarked during 
a public lecture given in the 1950’s, and for physics little has changed in the meantime. 
If a neutral metaphysical scheme describes Nature correctly we would not expect it to 
be easy to comprehend. In all other respects its comprehensibility is irrelevant here. If 
we decide, on the basis of Aristotle’s guidelines for their use, that a neutral 
metaphysical position would not constitute a breach of the laws for the dialectic nor 
require their modification, then we must find Proposition b) true.     
 
 
Part V  
 
 
The position is simply this. In ordinary algebra, complex values are accepted as a matter of 
course, and the more advanced techniques would be impossible without them. In Boolean 
algebra (and thus, for example, in all our reasoning processes) we disallow them. Whitehead 
and Russell introduced a special rule, which they called the Theory of Types, expressly to do 
so. Mistakenly, as it now turns out. So, in this field, the more advanced techniques, although 
not impossible, simply don’t yet exist. At the present moment we are constrained, in our 
reasoning processes, to do it the way it was done in Aristotle’s day.  
 
G. Spencer Brown 
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Laws of Form 
 
 
This, then, is the case that can be made in metaphysics for a neutral metaphysical 
position, or a sketch of its main components. Perhaps in this version it is not 
convincing, but it may be enough to show that while there is undoubtedly a sense in 
which mysticism is ‘at the opposite end to rational thought,’ as Paul Davies puts it, it is 
not in the sense that its metaphysical  scheme would be contrary to reason. We can 
now update our argument with a necessary proviso.  
 
a) All positive metaphysical positions are logically indefensible. 
b) A neutral metaphysical position is logically defensible.  
c) The universe is either metaphysically neutral or paradoxical.  
 
The conclusion is now more secure and all three propositions ought to be decidable by 
analysis. No appeal to mysticism is necessary, and yet this is an argument that must be 
defeated in philosophy if we wish to dismiss mysticism’s doctrine of unity as self-
delusion or superstition.    
 
It is a strictly metaphysical argument and as such it leaves open the possibility that a 
neutral metaphysical position would contradict the facts of the empirical sciences. 
There is a widespread presumption that eventually it will be found to do so, though no 
evidence as yet. This speculation cannot be suppressed in logic, where it will always 
remain a theoretical possibility that such contradictory facts exist, or even that the 
universe is paradoxical. Perhaps not all apples fall down. All we can say is that no 
empirical counter-evidence has been found to date. We need not worry that some 
evidence has been discovered and we have not heard about it, for the first person to 
announce a fact inconsistent with the truth of the perennial philosophy will become 
world-famous very quickly. As it happens, when we examine cases what we see is that 
rather than contradicting the facts this doctrine has over time become more and more 
obviously in conformity with them. The theory of emptiness was wholly incompatible 
with the old Newtonian universe, but it is difficult to see how it can be a bad theory if 
quantum mechanics is a good one. Moreover, on the analysis here it would be as true 
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in physics as it is in logic that proving Nagarjuna’s theory false would entail proving 
that the universe is paradoxical, and in physics and metaphysics this is just as 
impossible to do as proving the opposite.                  
 
By adding two further propositions our syllogism may be converted into something 
like a proof that the universe is not paradoxical. In metaphysics, where logical terms 
generally have referents ‘out there’ in reality, a logical argument depends on a universe 
that is systematic, law-governed, that is in most respects predictable, that evolves over 
time according to laws which would not contravene the laws by which we think. At the 
very least, metaphysicians must assume that these are qualities of our own minds and 
brains. We may not often make this premise explicit but it must always be there at least 
implicitly. As Bradley points out, that the universe is law-governed and systematic 
must be adopted as an initial premise even for an argument that the universe is 
paradoxical or unreasonable. For our argument to work we must either assume that the 
universe is reasonable, such that logical reasoning would be a guide to the truth about 
it, or, as we have here, add a proviso to our conclusion in case it is not. We could, if 
we wished, now drop this final proviso and instead make the reasonableness of the 
universe our starting premise. Then our starting premise would become also our final 
conclusion. Our starting premise would state that the universe is reasonable, such that 
all explanations of it are unreasonable except for the true one, and this premise would 
allow us to construct an argument proving that this is the case.        
 
It might be objected that neither Nagarjuna’s nor Bradley’s proof is successful, that 
Proposition a) has never been satisfactorily proved. This objection is possible because 
it is difficult to decide whether their proofs are successful. It would be very easy to 
doubt it. The issues are highly technical and few people would be competent to judge. 
This author is not one of them. But it does not really matter. While it would reflect 
badly on the skills of these philosophers if their proofs did fail it would make no 
difference here. The failure of a proof is not a counter-proof.  Their common result 
appears to be unassailable regardless of how it was reached. Metaphysics depends on 
an assumption that the universe has exactly one reasonable explanation. This seems to 
be a widely agreed principle everywhere and is presumably the reason why  
philosophers argue with each other. While this one explanation may or may not be 
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comprehensible, whether in practice or in principle, it is usually assumed that it will be 
logically defensible. If we assume that the universe is reasonable, and as long there is 
not an infinite quantity of logically absurd explanations of the universe to wade 
through, then sooner or later, by a process of elimination, metaphysics must arrive at a 
reasonable explanation and it will the correct one. This will be the only result that 
metaphysics can produce. This is what we would expect and what our initial premise 
predicts. And right from the start, over and over again, metaphysics has produced the 
same result. Those who see this as a failure of metaphysics see no significance in this 
result but they reach it all the same. Nagarjuna’s proof is famous for its rigour, brevity, 
clarity, elegance and explanatory power, but he proves only what quite ordinary 
metaphysicians routinely discover. His proof is an important philosophical exegesis of 
the Buddha’s teachings, but read purely as a logical proof it is probably redundant in 
today’s metaphysics, where his result has been reproduced in so many ways by 
countless people during the intervening centuries.   
 
It may seem implausible that it is possible to work out the truth about the universe in 
metaphysics, and there is no getting away from the fact that this is what is being 
proposed here. But is this not exactly what we would expect to be able to do? Why 
would it have to be impossible? When we assume that the universe is reasonable we 
assume that in principle it is possible for us to work out the truth about it in 
metaphysics. If we find that we can actually do this then we need not very surprised, 
regardless of how surprising our conclusion turns out to be. Metaphysics cannot be an 
antidote for dogmatic superstition if it is not a guide to truth. It proceeds by 
contradiction, by abduction, by inference to the best explanation, and if the universe is 
reasonable, and if we make no mistakes, then this procedure will eventually eliminate 
all logically absurd views. When we find that there is just one view remaining, and that 
try as we might we cannot eliminate it, then this is what we assumed would happen 
right from the start.  This is how metaphysics is supposed to be.  
 
Suppose the case for a neutral metaphysical position has been made, or might one day 
be made. What would remain to be done? Anything? Do we all go home? Is there still 
a research program or is it the end of metaphysics? It seems clear that it would be the 
end of metaphysics as we know it, or as many of us have known it for a long time, but 
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only in the sense that the boundaries of traditional metaphysics would have to be 
extended. Far from being the end of metaphysics it would be the final recognition that 
metaphysics has a vital role to play in our understanding of ourselves and our world. It 
would remain forever a compulsory stage of the analytically inclined philosopher’s 
journey, just not the final destination. There could never be an end to metaphysics 
while each generation of thinkers must retrace the steps of their predecessors in order 
to confirm and understand its conclusions. To avoid it entirely would be possible, but 
only by taking its ultimate futility on faith and setting out from where metaphysics 
usually ends, as the Buddha, whose focus is strictly soteriological, advises us to do. 
But we would not have to avoid it entirely to go beyond what a strictly scholastic 
metaphysics can achieve. We do not have to agree that a successful case for a neutral 
position is where metaphysics has to end, and can argue instead that this is where it 
begins in earnest. If we give metaphysics this broader definition then a vast amount of 
work would remain to be done, and much of it over and over again.        
 
Wittgenstein tells us that once we have climbed the ladder of his propositions we must 
abandon it. It will have served its purpose. In much the same way, once we have used 
our traditional metaphysics to refute all positive metaphysical positions we can 
abandon it. But not abolish it. Each philosopher will want to climb the ladder 
themselves. The survival of the traditional European model of metaphysics, 
constrained by an unrigorous medieval neo-Aristotelian logic to the study of positive 
metaphysical positions, is not threatened by this diagnosis of its problems, for its 
problems will always need to be understood and solved. A formal study of them would 
be necessary for a philosophical understanding of Nagarjuna’s solution even if in the 
end we reject it. And even if we find we must reject it will at least have dispensed with 
the popular idea that metaphysics is a waste of time.                      
 
If we define metaphysics as it is defined in mysticism, as the philosophical and scientific 
study of reality, existence and knowledge, then the concession that mysticism is a 
legitimate metaphysical doctrine would revitalise the traditional western academic 
discipline. It would now include the task of translating, systematising and making sense 
of mysticism in metaphysics, even if only for the purpose of once and for all refuting it, 
since we would no longer be able to simply ignore it. Whether we would still be 
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writing footnotes to Plato might depend on how we interpret him, but even if this is all 
we are doing they would be important notes. At this time these notes do not include a 
refutation of the view proposed here, and this glaring omission would require more 
than a footnote to repair. Other interesting questions arise once we relax our 
boundaries and allow them to be asked. We might ask how the ethical scheme of the 
Buddha would follow from the neutrality of his metaphysical position. If we can 
answer this question then we have used metaphysics to ground an ethical scheme in 
Nature. There seems no good reason why the study of this question should not be 
called metaphysics. There are dozens of such questions, and of such complexity and 
subtlety as to keep a metaphysician in work for ever. Metaphysics is, after all, alive and 
well in Buddhism, where meditation encompasses analysis. But the research program, 
which is what it would become if we throw off our shackles in this way, would have to 
be freed from the confines of medieval European metaphysics. Its boundaries are man 
made and do not define where the issues begin and end.           
 
Opportunities in other areas of knowledge would be similar in potential since many of 
the issues discussed here are under-researched. We would have to venture into some 
poorly charted areas of knowledge. In physics we might ask how the topology of 
Nagarjuna’s universe, which is somehow both extended and unextended, or neither 
exactly extended nor unextended, can be squared with quantum cosmology. In 
religion, if we really are in search of a metaphysic, we might examine what a neutral 
metaphysical scheme would imply for the interpretation of the scriptures of our own 
religion. Usually it is not difficult to find evidence of it in the language of our prophets 
and sages. In consciousness studies we might investigate the practicality of the 
modifications to Chalmer’s nonreductive ‘naturalistic dualism’ that would be required 
to make it equivalent with Nagarjuna’s doctrine, or with Barkin’s ‘relative 
phenomenalism’, and then see whether it would work as a fundamental theory. 
 
Mathematics is not the topic here, but so close is its connection with metaphysics that 
for the sake of the plausibility of our argument we must note one crucial mathematical 
implication. It might be objected that Proposition b) cannot be true, since to be 
considered reasonable, in the sense this term has been used here, a theory of the world 
as a whole, of everything there is, would have to take the form of a complete and 
 49
consistent formal axiomatic system of sufficient complexity to include mathematics. 
This is usually thought to be an impossible object. This objection, however, only draws 
attention to one of the most credible features of a neutral metaphysical position. The 
incompleteness theorem would be a proof of the necessity for such a theory. Gödel 
showed that the problem of completing a consistent metaphysical theory must arise for 
formal reasons, that it is not simply a lack of data, a fault with human reasoning or 
because the universe is paradoxical, and thus that it might not necessarily be a fault of 
mysticism that it cannot just come straight out and describe the universe in an 
unambiguous way. It is simply a property of sufficiently complex formal axiomatic 
systems of description that they cannot describe a universe that is complete and 
consistent. This is a limit of language, of course, and not evidence that universe is 
incomplete and/or inconsistent. In a mathematical translation Proposition b) would 
state that a neutral metaphysical position describes an exceptional kind of system, one 
for which all metaphysical statements having a Fregeian truth-value would be 
undecidable, consistent with its unconditioned axiom, the unmarked piece of paper 
from which Brown’s calculus of distinctions emerges, and as such is not constrained by 
the incompleteness theorem. For such a metaphysical system true theorems would 
seem paradoxical. For this system there would be not just the odd undecidable but true 
statement hidden away somewhere in the system, but all selective statements about the 
world as a whole would be undecidable. The incompleteness theorem would apply 
rather differently in these circumstances.  
  
It is not an objection, but there is certainly something worrying about the idea that we 
might be able to work out the truth about our own existence. Were we to succeed, or 
come to think we have succeeded, we would no longer be free to believe what we like. 
It is a worry that philosophers must live with. Metaphysics is a dangerous game if 
played seriously, and no doubt this does not contribute to its popularity. It might be 
important to say here, therefore, in order to make this legalistic argument for 
mysticism less immediately confrontational, that even if we were to become convinced 
that the universe can be described in metaphysics as a neutral metaphysical position, 
and even if we were to become convinced that the teachings of the wisdom traditions 
on some of these issues are essentially true, then we would not immediately be forced 
to throw away all of our current beliefs. In this respect mysticism is quite non-
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threatening. It is not as if we can understand its claims and their consequences for our 
beliefs from reading an essay. It is not at all obvious what it says about God, for 
instance, who for many readers will be the elephant in the room here, and it is really 
quite difficult to tell. In Islam, in quiet corners, the debate continues as to whether it is 
correct to say that Allah (‘Al-ahad,’ ‘the One’) may properly be called God, and with a 
unanimity that Schrödinger suggestively likens to the particles in a ideal gas the 
mystics say that we are God. On the other hand, in his Enneads Plotinus reminds us of 
the limits of our languages and concepts, and advises us that when we read the sayings 
of mysticism it is usually best to preface them with the words ‘It is as if’. If theism and 
atheism form an antinomy the adoption of a neutral metaphysical position confuses 
rather than clarifies the issue and we are not immediately confronted by a difficult 
choice. If we are swayed by the argument here we would have to acknowledge the 
plausibility of the doctrine of mysticism, but we would not immediately be confronted 
by a list of beliefs we are forced to adopt or reject. Rather, we would be faced with a 
set of conundrums that make it difficult to know what to believe. Mysticism asks us to 
suspend our beliefs and search for the facts. Only in empirical practice, where we 
cannot dismiss unpalatable conclusions as sophistry or the philosophical issues as too 
complex to call, can we actually be forced to alter our beliefs. We can also note that a 
neutral position is not the opposite of a positive position, for its opposite will be 
another positive position to which a neutral position is equally opposed. Whatever 
metaphysical belief a person holds there would most likely be some truth in it. There 
would be a certain sense in which Materialism is true and a sense in which Idealism is 
true; a sense in which the universe is eternal and a sense in which it is timeless; a sense 
in which we have freewill and a sense in which we do not; a sense in which 
consciousness exists and a sense in which it does not, and so on ad infinitum for the 
attributes of the Absolute, and also a sense in which the Absolute has no attributes, and 
even a sense in which there is no Absolute. These are symmetries that can be 
unbroken, distinctions that can be sublated, category-errors that can be corrected. 
Clearly it is difficult to pick a head-on fight with a neutral position, and its implications 
are not immediately threatening to our worldview or lifestyle in logic, where even if we 
understand the implications of our conclusions we can never be sure that we have not 
miscalculated, or even that the universe obeys our rules.                    
            
 51
We have been concerned here only with certain aspects of mysticism, those 
immediately relevant to the case at hand, and only with what can be learnt of mysticism 
from a literature survey. The result may be a partial, prosaic and even in some ways 
misleading. Fortunately, there is a vast ocean of literature available to correct any false 
impression conveyed here, little of which suffers from these faults. It is one of the great 
joys of studying this literature that it describes a world about as unprosaic as it would 
be possible for a world to be. This is not an introduction to mysticism, however, and 
our propositional argument does not even mention it. It is an attempt to show that a 
case may be made for a neutral metaphysical position in logic and, in support of this 
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